This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. Equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible allocations share similar properties to the market context (e.g., linear in information). The reason is that the market in general does not internalize the informational externality when public statistics (e.g., prices) convey information and does not balance optimally nonfundamental volatility and the dispersion of actions. Under strategic substitutability, equilibrium prices will tend to convey too little information when the "informational" role of prices prevails over its "index of scarcity" role and too much information in the opposite case. Under strategic complementarity, prices always convey too little information. The welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information. These results extend to the internal efficiency benchmark (accounting only for the collective welfare of the active players). Received results-on the relative weights placed by agents on private and public information, when the latter is exogenous-may be overturned. JEL-Code: D820, D830.
Introduction
There has been a recent surge of interest in the welfare analysis of economies with private information and in particular on the role of public information in such economies (see, e.g., Morris and Shin 2002; Angeletos and Pavan 2007; Amador and Weill 2010) . Agents may fail to place welfare-optimal weights on private and public information owing to payoff and information externalities. In this paper we examine the issue in a context where public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on public statistics when making their choices. In the rational expectations tradition, agents learn from prices and from public statistics in general, which are themselves the aggregate outcome of individual decisions.
Endogenous public information is relevant for a broad array of markets and situations.
In financial markets, prices are noisy statistics that arise from the decisions of traders.
In goods markets, prices aggregate information on the preferences of consumers and the quality of the products. In the overall economy, the release of GDP data is a noisy public signal that is the outcome of actions taken by economic agents. 1 Any welfare analysis of rational expectations equilibria faces several difficulties. First of all, it must employ a model capable of dealing in a tractable way with the dual role of prices as conveyors of information and determinants of traders' budget constraints. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) were pioneers in this respect with their CARA-normal model. Second, we require a welfare benchmark against which to test market equilibria in a world with asymmetric information. The appropriate benchmark for measuring inefficiency at the market equilibrium is the team solution in which agents internalize collective welfare but must still rely on private information when making their own decisions (Radner 1979; Vives 1988; Angeletos and Pavan 2007) . This is in the spirit of Hayek (1945) , where the private signals of agents cannot be communicated to a center. The team-efficient solution internalizes the payoff and information externalities associated with the actions of agents in the market.
Collective welfare may refer to the surplus of all market participants, active or passive, or may be restricted to the internal welfare of the active agents. The third challenge for such welfare analysis is dealing with the interaction of payoff and informational 1 See, for example, Rodríguez-Mora and Schulstad (2007). externalities. If we take as a benchmark a pure prediction model with no payoff externalities, then agents will typically rely too much on public information. The reason is that agents do not take into account that their reaction to private information affects the informativeness of public statistics and general welfare. In other words, agents do not internalize an information externality. Pure information externalities will make agents insufficiently responsive to their private information (Vives 1993 (Vives , 1997 Amador and Weill 2011) . We will see that payoff externalities complicate welfare analysis and may rebalance weightings in the opposite direction.
In this paper we consider a tractable linear-quadratic-Gaussian model that allows us to address the three challenges just described when public information is endogenously generated and influenced by the actions of agents. There is uncertainty about a common valuation parameter about which agents have private information, and the endogenous public statistic or "price" is noisy. We use a model with a rational expectations flavor but in the context of a well-specified game, where a continuum of agents compete in schedules, and allow actions to be strategic substitutes or complements. We focus our attention on linear Bayesian equilibria. The model is flexible and admits several interpretations in terms of firms competing in a homogenous product market, investment complementarities, monopolistic competition, traders (both rational and "behavioral") in a financial market, and asset auctions.
We show that agents correct the slope of their strategy according to what they learn from the public statistic and the character of competition. Under strategic substitutes competition the price's informational and index-of-scarcity roles conflict. With strategic substitutes and private information, a high price is bad news and the equilibrium schedule is steeper than with full information. In fact, in equilibrium schedules may slope the "wrong" way (e.g., downward for a supply schedule) when the informational role of prices dominates their index-of-scarcity role. This will occur when there is little noise in the public statistic. With strategic complements there is no conflict: a high price is good news, and the equilibrium schedule is flatter than with full information.
It is interesting that the impact on the slope of the equilibrium schedule of a change in the exogenous (prior) precision of public information is opposite to the change in the precision of the noise in the endogenous public signal; consequently, market depth is increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. The reason is that an increase in the exogenous precision of public information decreases the informational component of the public statistic whereas an increase in the endogenous precision increases it.
Furthermore, an increase in the degree of the game's complementarity will increase the response to private information and the dispersion of actions under strategic complements. The opposite results obtain under strategic substitutes.
Consider the collective welfare benchmark and an economy in which not only the full information equilibrium is efficient but also the equilibrium with private information when public information is exogenous (this is as in Vives 1988 or Section 5.3 in Angeletos and Pavan 2007) . We show that market equilibria will not be team-efficient even when the allowed allocations have properties (e.g., being linear in information) similar to those of the market equilibrium. This is because the market in general does not internalize the informational externality that results from public statistics (e.g., prices) conveying information. Indeed, a competitive agent is an information taker while the precision of the public statistic is endogenous. The market equilibrium is characterized by the privately efficient use of private information. Team efficiency instead makes socially efficient use of private information. Market equilibria will be team-efficient only in exceptional circumstances (as when the information externality vanishes). This occurs, for example, when public information is exogenous. We find that, under strategic substitutability, equilibrium prices will tend to convey too little information when the informational role of prices prevails and too much information when its index-of-scarcity role prevails. At the boundary of those situations there is a knife-edge case where parameters are such that agents use vertical schedules (as in a Cournot game), non contingent on the price (public statistic), and therefore the information externality disappears. In this particular case constrained efficiency is restored. Under strategic complementarity, prices always convey too little information.
The intuition of the results is as follows. Consider a homogenous product market with random demand and a continuum of firms competing in supply schedules with increasing and symmetric marginal costs with uncertain intercept. Each firm receives a private signal on the marginal cost intercept and this induces both allocative and productive inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency refers to a distorted total output and productive inefficiency refers to a distorted distribution of a given total output. The equilibrium in the complete information economy is efficient since it is competitive.
In this equilibrium all firms produce the same amount since they all have full information on costs, which are symmetric. The team-efficient solution in an economy with asymmetric information optimally trades off the tension between the two sources of welfare loss, allocative and productive inefficiency, when firms respond to private information. Allocative inefficiency is proportional to nonfundamental price volatility and productive inefficiency to the dispersion of individual actions. We can see, therefore, the team-efficient solution trading off both sources of welfare loss. We have that a higher response to private information makes prices more informative and reduces allocative inefficiency (since the total quantity is closer to the full information first best), as well as non-fundamental price volatility, but at the same time the dispersion of quantities increases and with it productive inefficiency. The somewhat surprising possibility that prices are too informative arises then since at the market solution firms may respond excessively to private information generating too much productive inefficiency. In this case there is too little non-fundamental price volatility. This happens under strategic substitutability, when the dual role of prices conflict, if the index of scarcity role of prices dominates the information role. When this does not happen and prices convey too little information, which is always the case with strategic complementarity, then there is excessive volatility at the market solution.
More precise information, be it public or private, reduces the welfare loss at the teamefficient solution. The reason is that the direct impact of the increased precisions is to decrease the welfare loss and this is the whole effect since at the team-efficient solution the response to private and public information are already (socially) optimized. In contrast, at the market solution an increase in, say, the precision of private information will increase the response of an agent to his private signal and this will tend to increase the welfare loss when the market calls already for a too large response to private information. If this indirect effect is strong enough the welfare loss may be increasing with the precision of private information. In principle the same effect could happen with the precision of public information but we can show that the indirect effect of changes in both the exogenous public precision of information and the precision of the noise in the endogenous public signal are always dominated by the direct effect. The result is that the welfare loss at the market solution is always decreasing with the precisions of public information.
Recent literature has examined the circumstances under which more public information actually reduces welfare (as in Burguet and Vives 2000; Morris and Shin 2002; Angeletos and Pavan 2007; Weill 2010, 2011) . In Burguet and Vives (2000) a higher (exogenous) public precision may discourage private information acquisition and lead to a higher welfare loss in a purely informational externality model. In Morris and Shin (2002) the result is driven by a socially excessive incentive to coordinate by agents. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) qualify this result and relate it to the payoff externalities present in a more general model. In Amador and Weill (2010) a public release of information reduces the informational efficiency of prices and this effect may dominate the direct information provision effect. Their model is purely driven by information externalities in the presence of strategic complementarities in terms of responses to private information. 2 In our model more public information is not damaging welfare but more private precision may be. This happens when at the market solution there is already too much dispersion of actions and an increase in private precision exacerbates the problem.
The results can be extended to the internal team-efficient benchmark (where only the collective welfare of the players is taken into account, for example, ignoring passive consumers). In this case also, endogenous public information may overturn conclusions reached using exogenous information models (e.g., Angeletos and Pavan 2007) when the informational role of the price is in conflict and dominates its index of scarcity role.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the leading interpretation of firms competing in a homogenous product market. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and Section 4 its comparative statics properties and the 2 Ganguli and Yang (2009) The payoff to player i can be written as
where p is the public statistic, and the dual role of  as both a parameter in the payoff function and in the public statistic should be noted. This situation arises naturally in the applications. schedules and realization of the signals, the profits for player are given by
. This formulation has a rational expectations flavor but in the context of a well-specified schedule game. We will restrict our attention to linear Bayesian equilibria of the schedule game. The model admits several interpretations and we present below the leading one linking supply function competition and rational expectations (see Section 6 for the other interpretations). 6
Firms competing in a homogenous product market with quadratic production costs.
In this case, p u x       is the inverse demand for the homogenous product, i x is the output of firm i , and the cost function of firm i is given by
Firms use supply functions as strategies, and markets clear: If 0   , then demand is downward sloping and we have strategic substitutability in the usual partial equilibrium market. If 0   , we have strategic complementarity and demand is upward sloping. The latter situation may arise in the case of a network good with compatibility.
We will maintain a supply interpretation of the model up to Section 6. We let
be the marginal benefit or "price" of taking an action and let i x x     be the marginal cost. 5 We assign zero payoffs to the players if there is no that solves the fixed point problem. If there are multiple solutions, then the one that maximizes volume is chosen. p
Equilibrium
We are interested in a linear (Bayesian) equilibrium-equilibrium, for short-of the schedule game for which the public statistic functional is of type . Since the payoffs and the information structure are symmetrical and since payoffs are strictly concave, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria. Indeed, the solution to the problem of player i ,
is both unique (given strict concavity of profits) and symmetric across players (since the cost function and signal structure are symmetric across firms):
A strategy for player i may be written as
in which case the aggregate action is given by
here the random variable z a     is informationally equivalent to the "price" or public statistic p . Because u is random, z (and the public statistic) will typically generate a noisy signal of the unknown parameter  .
Market depth-that is, the inverse of how much the price moves to accommodate a unit increase in u-is given by  
we can posit strategies of the form 7 See, for example, Kyle (1985) .
) and so p and z will move together. The strategy of player i is then given by
We can solve for the LE in the usual way: identifying coefficients with the candidate
 and using the supply function of a player.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
where is the unique (real) solution of the equation a  
In equilibrium,
Remark 1. We have examined linear equilibria of the schedule game for which the public statistic function is of type   , u  
. In fact, these are the equilibria in strategies with bounded means and with uniformly (across players) bounded variances.
(See Claim 1 in the Appendix.)
Remark 2. We can show that the equilibrium in the continuum economy is the limit of equilibria in replica economies that approach the limit economy. Take the homogenous market interpretation with a finite number of firms n and inverse demand n
where n x  is the average output per firm, and with the same informational assumptions. In this case, given the results in Section 5.2 of Vives (2011), the supply function equilibrium of the finite n -replica market converges to the equilibrium in Proposition 1.
The public statistic or price serves a dual role as index of scarcity and conveyor of information. Indeed, a high price has the direct effect of increasing an agent's competitive supply, but it also conveys news about costs-namely, that costs are high
In equilibrium, the "price impact" (or inverse of the depth of the market) is always positive,
and excess demand is downward or upward sloping depending on  :
. That is, the slope's direction depends on whether the competition is in strategic substitutes or in strategic complements.
In equilibrium, agents take public information z , with precision
given and use it to form probabilistic beliefs about the underlying uncertain parameter
beliefs and optimization, in turn, determine the coefficients a and c for private and public information, respectively. In equilibrium, the informativeness of public information z depends on the sensitivity of strategies to private information :
. Agents behave as information takers and so, from the perspective of an individual agent, public information is exogenous. This fact is at the root of the equilibrium's informational externality. That is, agents fail to account for the impact of their own actions on public information and hence on other agents. 
In all three cases, there is no information externality via the public statistic.
As u   tends to ∞, the precision of prices   also tends to ∞, the weight given to private information a tends to 0 , and the equilibrium collapses (with
Indeed, the equilibrium becomes fully revealing and is not implementable.
Comparative statics and the value of information
This section studies the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium and how the weights and the responses to public and private information vary with underlying parameters. The following proposition presents a first set of results. The effects of changes in the degree of complementarity are dealt with afterwards.
Proposition 2. Let 0    and 0 u   . In equilibrium, the following statements hold.
(i) Responsiveness to private information a decreases from The same happens when 0   (in which case there is no payoff externality, either).
(ii)
Responsiveness to the public statistic ĉ goes from 1
How the equilibrium weights to private and public information vary with the deep parameters of the model help to explain the results. We have that . The result is that an increase in  increases the public precision 10  and decreases the response to private information. We have also that increasing the precision of the prior decreases the informational component
, while that increasing the precision of the noise in the price
In order to gain further intuition from these results, we first consider the case 0   . Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results on the equilibrium strategy. 
. The results are summarized in Table 2 . 
Increased reliance on public information as complementarity increases is a general theme in the work of Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) 
Under our assumptions, 0     and the TS function is strictly concave for symmetric solutions.
The equilibrium is partially revealing (with 0 u     and 0      ), so expected total surplus should be strictly greater in the first-best allocation (full information)
which is just the market solution with full information, than at the LE. The reason is that suppliers produce under uncertainty and rely on imperfect idiosyncratic estimation of the common cost component; hence they end up producing different amounts even though costs are identical and strictly convex.
However, since producers are competitive they produce in expected value the right amount at the equilibrium:  
The welfare benchmark that we use is the team solution maximizing expected total surplus subject to employing linear decentralized strategies (as in Vives 1988; Angeletos and Pavan 2007) . This team-efficient solution internalizes the information externalities of the actions of agents, and it is restricted to using the same type of strategies (decentralized and linear) that the market employs. Indeed, when reacting to information, an agent in the market does not take into account the influence her own actions have on public statistics.
It is worth noting that in the economy considered if firms would not condition on prices, i.e. if each firm would set quantities conditioning only on its private information, then the market solution would be team-efficient (Vives 1988 ). This will not be the case in general when public information is endogenous because of information externalities.
At the team-efficient solution, expected total surplus   TS E
is maximized under the constraint that firms use decentralized linear production strategies. That is,
Equivalently, the team-efficient solution minimizes, over the restricted strategies, the expected welfare loss WL with respect to the full information first best. It is possible
where the first term in the sum corresponds to allocative inefficiency (how distorted is the average quantity x  while producing in a cost-minimizing way), which is proportional to
, and the second term to productive inefficiency (how distorted is the distribution of production of a given average quantity x  ), which is proportional to the dispersion of outputs
p be the full information first best price. Note that the non-fundamental price volatility is given by and therefore it is proportional to allocative inefficiency.
It is easily seen that the form of the optimal team strategy is 
. This yields a strictly convex WL as a function of . Changing has opposite effects on both sources of the welfare loss since allocative inefficiency decreases with a , as price informativeness a a  increases and the average quantity gets close to the full information allocation, but productive inefficiency increases with a as dispersion increases. Note that a more informative price reduces allocative inefficiency and non-fundamental price volatility but increases productive inefficiency. The team solution optimally trades them off among decentralized strategies.
If there was no information externality a would not affect  (which would be exogenous). In this case it is easy to see that the team and the market solution
Otherwise there is an information externality and the market is inefficient.
The sign of the information externality can be found easily by breaking down the impact of the sensitivity to private information a on   TS E between the market effect, where the public statistic z is taken as given, and the information externality effect (IE), where the impact on is taken into account. z
The market term is null at the market solution (denoted *) and the IE term can be evaluated as follows:
The sign of the informational externality depends on whether we have strategic substitutes or complements competition and on whether supply slopes upwards or downwards. If 0   there is adverse selection and a high price indicates high costs.
If supply is upward sloping ( ) and, say, costs are high ( * 0 c  0     ) then an increase in a will increase i x (
). This means that IE and that must be reduced. If supply is downward sloping ( ) in the same situation an increase in a will decrease At the equilibrium with strategic substitutability, for which 0   , and since then is decreasing in * c u  , there is too much (not enough) weight given to private information whenever u  is small (large) and supply functions are increasing (decreasing). In the second case the market displays too much allocative inefficiency (the price contains too little information); in the first too little, the price is too informative, and there is too much productive inefficiency. With strategic
always, agents give insufficient weight to private information and the market displays too much allocative inefficiency.
There is no information externality when firms have perfect information (     ) and the full information, first-best outcome (price equal to marginal cost) is obtained;
when the price contains no information ( 
 . The case 0 u   is akin to the case with exogenous public information where the market allocation is constrained efficient (Vives (1988) , Angeletos and Pavan (2007) ). Constrained efficiency no longer holds when the information externality is present.
The conclusion is that, with strategic substitutability, team efficiency requires a decrease (increase) in c when is negative (positive). When , the informational role of the price dominates and the price reveals too little information.
In this case, more weight should be given to private signals so that public information becomes more revealing to reduce allocative inefficiency. Conversely Remark 3. If the signals of agents can be communicated to a center, then questions arise concerning the incentives to reveal information and how welfare allocations may be modified. This issue is analyzed in a related model by Messner and Vives (2006) , who use a mechanism design approach along the lines of Laffont (1985) .
The question arises as of how the welfare loss WL at the market solution depends on information precisions   , u  and   . We know that WL at a linear allocation as a function of is given by the strictly convex function a
It is immediate then that at the team-efficient solution 
is maximized under the constraint that agents use decentralized linear strategies. Since the solution
. This is the cooperative solution from the players' perspective. That is,
It should be clear that the market solution, not even with complete information, will attain the full information cooperative outcome (denoted M for monopoly, for which
where joint profits are maximized under full information. This is so since the market solution does not internalize the payoff externalities and therefore if 0   it will produce an expected output
which is too high (low) with strategic substitutes (complements) in relation to the optimal
. Furthermore, the market solution does not internalize the information externalities. At the internal team (IT) benchmark, joint profits are maximized and information externalities internalized with decentralized strategies. 13 The question is whether the market solution allocates the correct weights (from the players' collective welfare viewpoint) to private and public information. We show that the answer to this question is qualitatively similar to the one derived when analyzing the total surplus team benchmark.
As before, it can be seen that the internal team-efficient solution minimizes, over the restricted strategies, the expected loss L with respect to the full information cooperative outcome M x , and that
The first term in the sum corresponds to allocative inefficiency in the average quantity, which is proportional to
, and the second term to productive inefficiency, which is proportional to       .
It can checked that the form of the internal optimal team strategy is 
This yields a strictly convex L as a function of a . As before, changing has opposite effects on both sources of the loss. Now the internal team solution optimally trades off the sources of the loss with respect to the responsiveness to private information among decentralized strategies which internalize payoff externalities.
In this case at the market solution there is both an information (IE) and a payoff (PE) externality, even with full information the market solution is not efficient (i.e. cooperative). The impact of the externalities on the response to private information can be assessed similarly as before. The market takes the public statistic z or p as given while the internal team solution takes into account both the impact on public informativeness (IE) and on payoffs (PE):
The market term is null at the market solution and the sum of the IE and PE terms can be evaluated as follows:
It is worth noting that while, as before, 
since at the market solution 1 1 c   ) while i x will tend to be low (since at the market solution 
This is the same qualitative result concerning the response to private information as derived previously using the total surplus team benchmark-with the following proviso: when * 0 c  , it need not be the case that there is too little response to private information. In this section we extend the interpretation of the model to other applications. Under monopolistic competition, the total surplus function (consistent with the differentiated demand system) is slightly different:
Here the market is not efficient under complete information because price is not equal to marginal cost. Each firm has some residual market power. The results of Section 4 do not apply but those of Section 5 apply when firms collude. It is interesting to note then that, if agents cannot use contingent strategies and there is no information externality issue (as in, e.g., cases of Cournot or Bertrand competition), Angeletos and Pavan (section 6.5, 2007) argue that the strategic complementarity case would exhibit excessive response to private information (the opposite of what occurs with endogenous public information) and that strategic substitutability would exhibit insufficient response to private information (in contrast with the case for endogenous public information, where either excessive or insufficient response to private information is possible). where u is random. When 0   , the behavioral agents are "value" traders who buy (sell) when the price is low (high). When 0   , the behavioral agents are "momentum" traders who buy (sell) when the price is high (low). 16 Our inverse 16 Gennotte and Leland (1990) interpret the case 0   as program traders following a portfolio insurance strategy. Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2009) fundamental price volatility with the dispersion of individual actions. Only in exceptional circumstances (i.e., when the information externality vanishes) does the market get it right and strikes the optimal trade off between volatility and dispersion.
Under strategic substitutability, prices will tend to convey too little information when the informational role of prices prevails over its index-of-scarcity role, or will convey too much information in the opposite case. Under strategic complementarity, such as in the presence of a network good, prices always convey too little information. The inefficiency of the market solution opens the door to the possibility that more precise public or private information will lead to an increased welfare loss. This is the case when the market already calls for a too large response to private information, then more precise private information exacerbates the problem.
These results extend to the internal team benchmark, in which the players' collective welfare is taken into account, as long as the index-of-scarcity role of prices prevails over their informational role. When this is not the case, the amount of information in prices may be above or below the welfare benchmark. It follows that received results on the optimal relative weights to be placed on private and public information (when the latter is exogenous) may be overturned when the informational role of the price conflicts with its index of scarcity role and the former is important enough. 
